Professor Rao provides a comprehensive review of pricing research in marketing science. I will not repeat the details of that review here save to say that the review indicates a diversity of pricing research within the developing field of marketing science. Professor Rao's review and this, the second Rochester Conference on the interface of economics and marketing science, provide us with the opportunity to reflect upon the continuing joint evolution of our two disciplines. As a marketing scientist who has found economic models and concepts useful in addressing marketing issues, let me comment upon these evolutions from a marketing science perspective. However, as I portray these evolutions in the extreme, I note that the boundaries are fluid with much overlap and merging of ideas and issues. Differences are in degree, not in fundamental philosophy.
In the extreme, price theory in economics deals with how markets behave while price theory in marketing science deals with how managers should act.
It is true that one must understnad how managers behave in order to model market behavior and that one must understand how markets behave in order to advise managers. The difference is not in the comprehensiveness of the analyses but in the emphasis. A typical economic analysis will simplify the model of the manager's task in order to study the essential forces of the market. In contrast, the typical marketing science analysis will simplify the model of the market mechanism in order to study the essential profit impacts of the actions by the marketing manager. I will comment more upon these simplications later. With these perspectives in mind, let us now examine how each discipline can contribute, to the other. I base my speculations on the state of the art reviews by Rao (1982) and Nagle (1982) presented at this conference.
Economics Offers Marketing a Theoretical Framework
It is clear from Nagle (1982) Almost every frequently purchased consumer packaged good decreases in unit price as the size of the box increases. These issues have been addressed in the marketing literature, e.g., Guadagni and Little (1982) model choice for different sizes of coffee, but not within the elegant economic framework.
One issue that is not explicitly discussed by Nagle but pervades his review is the issue of market equilibrium. One of the strengths of economic theory is that many models consider not how a single firm reacts, but instead the end result of firms acting and reacting to one another until a stable price equilibrium is attained. By understanding such market equilibria, a manager can understand the long term implications of his actions.
Equilibrium analysis has tremendous potential as more marketing scientists turn to strategic problems where the reaction of a competitor can be as important as the reactions of consumers. Prior to today's strategic analyses, most marketing science models analyzed tactical decisions (advertising -3- (Hauser and Shugan, 1982) . We analyze fully the equilibrium where only the attacking and defending brand can act, but hold constant all other brands. Despite these criticisms, I feel these marketing science models represent interesting first steps because, while they sacrifice some equilibrium considerations, they emphasize much more richness in marketing phenomena than I see in many economic equilibrium models.
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However, the marketing scientist should proceed with caution into the quagmire of equilibrium analyses. To obtain analytic results, assumptions must be made. These assumptions may be appropriate when one's focus is the market, but the assumptions may be overly restrictive for marketing problems.
For example, symmetry, uniformly distributed tastes, and unidimensional quality scales are not uncommon assumptions. Some equilibrium analyses require that firms act as if their competitor holds a constant strategy -4-III (although the firm may predict where such myopic unilateral behavior will lead).
It is incumbent upon marketing scientists to adapt, not simply adopt, economic theory. For example, Lancaster (1979) and Lane (1980) For an interesting marketing science paper that uses empirical evidence to question the specification of two economic-theory based models of advertising, I recommend Little (1979 conversation) points out that temporary price reductions often differ from permanent price reductions because such "promotions" are usually tied in with special "end-aisle displays", "shelf-talkers", and supplementary advertising.
These actions have an effect beyond simple price elasticity. Blattberg, Buesing, Peacock, and Sen (1978) suggest that certain consumers anticipate a return to the steady state price and so increase their home inventory. In the future, with the advent of large transactional data bases based on universal product code (UPC) panels, an improved empirically-grounded price response theory may shake the foundations of some economic models.
Side by side with accumulated empirical experience is marketing's focus on measurement. To be successful, normative models must be used and to be used, one must be able to measure parameters. (I note in passing that theoretical marketing science models may be empirically-grounded without new, primary measurement).
Examples of measurement abound. Hanssens (1980) uses ARIMA models to estimate price elasticity. Goldberg, Green and Wind (this conference) use a direct measurement procedure called conjoint measurement to obtain a distribution of "utility" functions mapping price and product attributes into a preference scale. Guadagni and Little (1982) use logit models calibrated on UPC data to obtain market response to price and promotion. And, some of my own work (Hauser and Simmie 1981 , Hauser and Shugan 1982 , and Hauser and Gaskin 1983 uses price-scaled perceptual mapping procedures to model price response. I have no doubt, that, with the appropriate caveats and with reasonable error bounds, these and other marketing science procedures can parameterize economic models of price response.
Price response may not be separable from consumer information processing.
Price carries cues that influence consumers' perceptions and agendas; price helps consumers frame decisions; and price may be more than just time and money. Many marketing scientists have focused on consumer information
processing. These models of consumer response are rich in psychological phenomena and are often empirically-grounded. Merging these models with mathematical economic theory holds unbounded potential for new insights.
Rather than review this literature in detail, I refer the reader to Bettman (1979) , Sternthal and Craig (1982) , Tversky and Kahneman (1981), and Shugan (1980) .
Finally, marketing scientists, by self-selection, tend to be close to managerial decision making. Hence, normative and descriptive marketing science models are developed to incorporate decision variables that are of interest to marketing managers. Thus, at the level of the firm, the models are often more complex than corresponding economics models. This added complexity is both necessary and relevant. Sometimes price setting actions can be decoupled from other marketing actions, e.g., Hauser and Shugan (1982, -7-Theorem 6) but in other cases they cannot, e.g., Shugan and Jeuland (1982) .
Perhaps ultimately, the essential marketing phenomena can be abstracted from the complexity of today's marketing models. The process of abstraction and the incorporation of new marketing phenomena in economic theory will improve the theoretical base in both disciplines.
Some Challenges
It is easy to suggest the need for a unified comprehensive model. But such a comprehensive model may be too complex to be useful. Instead, I feel the greatest opportunity for cross-fertilization is in understanding the appropriate tradeoffs for the problems being addressed. When the focus is on market behavior, the challenge is to abstract essential marketing phenomena to which policy implications are sensitive. When the focus is on normative analyses for a target firm, the challenge is to adapt economic theory through marketing science modifications. This will ensure that actions that appear good in the short run are indeed in the long term interests of the firm. Both challenges are exciting, rewarding, stimulating, formidable, intriguing, and fun.
Conferences such as this, the second Rochester Conference, facilitate dialogue that encourage us to understand the "other" discipline and, in doing so, understand our own discipline better. Such dialogue enables us to disencumber our own belief structures and avoid the religious ferver akin to that experienced in the 16t and 17th centuries by Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo when they challenged established scientific theories.
1 For those readers who have the history of science stored in the shadowy recesses of long term memory, the Ptolemaic model of celestial mechanics, developed in 146 by Ptolemy, had the Earth at the center of the universe and an amazingly complex set of spheres within spheres explaining the motion of the sun, the moon, and the stars. In 1543, Copernicus placed the sun at the center with the Earth revolving around it, but he still had to retain "epicycles" to explain some of the complex motions of planets.
(Centuries before Ptolemeny, a few Greek philosophers placed the sun at the center, but these ideas were discarded in favor of the Ptolemaic model.) Finally, in 1609, using the data of Tycho Brahe, Kepler published his three laws of motion which better explained the motion of the planets. Of course, in 1916, Einstein explained the precession of the orbit of Mercury with General Relativity and... (Encyclopedia Americana, 1967 ).
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